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PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY: THE 
RESPONSE TO PRENATAL DRUG USE 
Margaret P. Spencer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
DRUG abuse by pregnant women has increased dramatically in the last ten years.1 As many as fifteen percent of all pregnant women 
ingest illegal drugs during their pregnancies.2 As a result, the number 
of drug-exposed infants has reached epidemic proportions. In 1989, the 
National Association on Perinatal Addiction Research and Education 
conservatively estimated that 375,000 drug-exposed infants are born 
each year-at least one out of every ten births in the United States.3 
The escalation of prenatal drug use was, in large part, driven by 
the emergence of inexpensive, highly addictive crack cocaine. Since the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. 
B.A., 1969, Howard University; J.D. 1972, University of Virginia. The author would like to thank 
Paul Marcus, Rodney Smolla, and Richard Williamson for their helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this article. 
1. As used in this article, the term "drugs" designates those controlled substances, ..,.;th the 
exception of marijuana, listed in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-812 (West 
1981 & Supp. 1992). Marijuana is excluded because hospitals rarely screen or report prenatal 
exposure to marijuana, and because insufficient information exists on the eiTects of marijuana 
exposure on infants. See Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem of the Drug Exposed New-
born: A Return to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REv. 745, 753 n.2S (1990). Prenatal expo-
sure to tobacco and alcohol are also not addressed. The use of these substances is lawful, and the 
resultant harm to the fetus, while substantial, is neither as substantial nor as well documented as 
the harm from drug use. Moreover, states rarely seek punitive sanctions against "pregnant al· 
coholics." Jan Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted-And Guilty?, NY TIMES, Aug. 19, 1990, § 6 
(Magazine), at 34, 35. 
2. Rorie Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1, 28. 
3. The most frequently cited estimate of 375,000 was based on a study by the National Asso-
ciation on Perinatal Addiction Research and Education. The study included heroin, methadone, 
cocaine, amphetamines, PCP, and marijuana. See Julie Johnson, White House Seeks Policy to 
Reduce Infant Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1989, at 024; Richard Lacayo, Nobody's Children, 
TIME, Oct. 9, 1989, at 91, 92. In 1991, the federal government estimated that 11% of the bJbies 
born in the United States had been exposed to drugs or alcohol. David Haldane, A Step Up, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1991, at Bl. Charles Rangel, Chairman or the House Committee on Prenatal Sub-
stance Abuse, claims that 739,000 drug-exposed children are born each year. Charles B. Rangel, 
The Severity of the Crack Baby Crisis, WASIL PoST, Feb. 4, 1992, at Al4 (letter to the editor). 
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mid-1980s, crack cocaine has increased in availability and popularity, 
particularly among women of childbearing age.• It is estimated that by 
the year 2000, the annual number of cocaine-exposed infants may be 
anywhere from 500,000 to 4,000,000. r; 
These statistics and concomitant media attention have generated 
legal, social, and medical debate about the appropriate response to the 
prenatal drug use problem. Not surprisingly, many states have viewed 
prenatal drug use as just another part of our nation's growing "drug 
crisis." Their approach to the problem has been similar to the federal 
government's response to the "drug crisis"-aggressive enforcement of 
existing criminal statutes and proposals for new legislation.6 
Approximately 180 women have been arrested in the United 
States for offenses related to their prenatal drug use.7 The charges 
against most of these women were based on novel interpretations of 
existing drug-trafficking or child-abuse statutes. These women have 
been charged with drug possession, drug distribution, delivery of drugs 
to minors, and criminal child abuse or neglect.8 
4. Almost one-half of the crack addicts in the United States are women. Unlike heroin, crack 
may encourage sexual activity, and some crack addicts support their habit by prostitution. Diane 
Alters, Women and Crack: Equal Addiction, Unequal Care, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. I, 1989, at AI. 
Some experts estimate that 75% of the prenatal drug users have ingested cocaine. AMA Bd. of 
Trustees, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal 
Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666 (1990), 
5. Joyce Price, District Leads Way in Helping Schools Handle Crack Babies, WASH. TIMES, 
Apr. 2, 1991, at AI. Other studies suggest that 10,000 to 100,000 infants are exposed annually to 
crack cocaine. See Douglas J. Besharov, The Children of Crack: Will We Protect Them?, PuB. 
WELFARE, Fall1989, at 6, 7; Kathleen Nolan, Protecting Fetuses from Prenatal Hazards: Whose 
Crimes? What Punishment?, 9 CRIM. JuST. ETHICS 13, 14 (1990}. 
6. The government's "war on drugs" caused a 247% increase in federal drug prosecutions 
from 1980 to 1989. I BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, No. 3, NAT'L 
UPDATE 2 (1992}. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of convictions for federal drug offenses 
increased 213%, and the percentage of convicted federal offenders who were drug-law violators 
rose from 17% to 33%. /d. at 2, 6. In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which 
authorized capital punishment for drug traffickers, 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e} (West Supp. 1992}, and 
established a grant program to assist state and local governments in the prosecution of drug-
related offenses. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3751 (West Supp. 1992}. · 
7. Rorie Sherman, Split Rulings for Fetal Abuse Cases, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 3, 10. 
8. In Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and South Caro-
lina, women were charged with drug distribution or delivery. In Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, and Texas, women were charged with drug possession. In Nevada and South Da-
kota, women were charged with drug use or drug ingestion. In Ohio, South Carolina, and 
Virginia, women were charged with child neglect or abuse. See Lynn Paltrow & Suzanne Shende, 
ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project Memorandum, State by State Case Summary of Criminal 
Prosecutions Against Pregnant Women (May 21, 1991) (on file with author}. An Illinois grand 
jury refused to indict a mother for manslaughter after her cocaine-exposed newborn died from 
brain damage. Isabel Wilkerson, Jury in Illinois Refuses to Charge Mother in Drug Death of 
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Prosecutions based on criminal child abuse statutes have had in-
frequent success. Courts have repeatedly held that a fetus is not a 
"child" within the meaning of statutes prohibiting acts endangering the 
welfare of children.9 Thus, prenatal drug use which affects a fetus is 
not prohibited by these statutes. 
Prosecutions under drug distribution and delivery statutes have 
also failed. These cases were based on the mother's postpartum transfer 
of drugs through the umbilical cord to her newborn child. Defendants 
challenged these prosecutions on several grounds. They claimed due 
process violations based on inadequate ·notice that drug use is 
equivalent to drug distribution, and lack of legislative intent to include 
the involuntary passage of drugs through the umbilical cord within the 
definition of drug delivery to minors. Defendants have also challenged 
these prosecutions as violations of the Equal Protection Clause and the 
right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution.10 To date, trial and appel-
late courts have dismissed these criminal cases.11 
Because prosecutions under existing criminal statutes have not 
been successful, many states have considered new legislation, and sev-
Newborn, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1989, at A10. 
9. More than a dozen courts "have dismissed cases against pregnant substance abusers, find-
ing [that] .•. 'courts cannot presume a legislative intent to Cl\p:lnd the class or p:rsons treatable 
as victims of criminal activity.'" Sherman, supra note 7, at 10 (quoting Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals Judge R.W. Dyche III). See People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y .S.2d 843 (City Ct. 1992) (hold-
ing that a fetus did not constitute a child within the meaning of the criminal endangerment stat-
ute); State v. Gray, 568 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (allowing a jurisdictional motion but 
dismissing the case). But see Associated Press, Cccaine Use in Pregnancy Amounls to Child 
Abuse, A Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1989, at A22 (woman convicted of child abuse in 
illinois for prenatal cocaine use). 
10. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992). 
11. On July 23, 1992, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the only conviction against a 
prenatal drug user for delivery of drugs to her newborn b:lby. The court held that Florida's statute 
prohibiting delivery of drugs to minors did "not encomp:lSS 'delivery' of an illegal drug derh-ativc 
from womb to placenta to umbilical cord to newborn after a child's birth.'' Id. at 1296, rev'g 578 
So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In its opinion the court cited a number of other cases that 
had been dismissed by trial courts. /d. at 1294. The court further noted that in most of these 
cases, judges found that interpreting drug-trafficking statutes to prohibit distribution of drugs to a 
newborn infant was contrary to legislative history. /d. See, e.g., People v. Hardy, 469 N.W .2d 50, 
52-53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). 
Civil protective-custody cases have been more succ:cssful. See Sherman, supra note 7, at 10. 
Beginning in 1980, some courts have held that prenatal drug usc resulting in the birth of drug-
exposed infants establishes civil child neglect. See, e.g., In re Baby X, 293 N. W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1980). For a description of civil child-neglect cases and cases involving the termination of 
parental rights, see Christina V. Burdette, Note, Fetal Protection-An {)o.·erview of Recent State 
Legislative Response to Crack Cocaine Abuse by Pregnant Women, 22 ME..~t ST. U L REv 119, 
125-26 (1991). 
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eral states have recently enacted statutes designed to protect the un-
born child from prenatal harm.12 Proposed legislation in at least four 
states would make the act of giving birth to a drug-exposed infant a 
felony.13 
Several members of Congress have supported such new legisla-
tion.14 A bill was introduced in the Senate authorizing federal prenatal 
health care money only to states with a statute prohibiting prenatal 
drug use. The bill provided that the state statute must make the act of 
giving birth to a drug-exposed infant a felony punishable by at least 
three years imprisonment. 111 
Although public support for criminal sanctions existed/8 neither 
the Senate bill nor any of the state bills were enacted. Moreover, medi-
cal and legal scholars strongly criticized the use of any criminal sanc-
tion to address the problem of prenatal drug use. Many claimed the 
prosecutions were ineffective and counter-productive. Drug-using preg-
nant women were deterred from seeking prenatal care and were being 
punished, some argued, not for their drug use, but for having babies.17 
12. Sherman, supra note 7, at 10; Catherine A. Kyres, Note, A "Cracked" Image of My 
Mother/Myself? The Need for a Legislative Directive Proscribing Maternal Drug Abuse, 25 Nsw 
ENG. L. REV. 1325, 1332 n.41 {1991). 
13. See Nancy K. Schiff, Note, Legislation Punishing Drug Use During Pregnancy: Attack on 
Women's Rights in the Name of Fetal Protection, 19 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 197 (1991). Legisla-
tion irttroduced in Georgia, Louisiana, Ohio, and Colorado would make it a felony to give birth to 
a drug-addicted child. /d. at 206-08. The bill proposed in Ohio would impose severe penalties, 
including mandatory birth control implants. /d. at 207. A proposed bill in Colorado would expand 
the definition of criminal child abuse to include the abuse of a controlled substance during preg-
nancy. /d. at 208. Legislatures in at least nine states have tried to amend the definition of child 
abuse in civil statutes to include prenatal substance abuse. Sherman, supra note 7, at I 0. 
14. Dave Fratello, Prosecution of Pregnant Addicts Won't Prevent Crack Babies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 29, 1991, at A26. 
15. The proposed "Child Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1989" stated that grants 
would be awarded to "[s]tates to develop, implement, and operate five pilot projects for . , , 
providing outreach, education, and treatment services concerning substance abuse to pregnant fe· 
males, postpartum females and their infants." S. 1444, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (1989). "To 
be eligible to receive a grant ... , a State shall submit ... a certification that[] it is a crime in 
such State to abuse a child, and that such abuse includes giving birth to an infant who is addicted 
or otherwise injured or impaired by the substance abuse of its mother during pregnancy; •.. the 
female so convicted shall be sentenced to a period of 3 years of mandatory rehabilitation in a 
custodial setting .... " S. 1444, § 3(c)(4), (5). 
16. A 1990 survey of 15 states by the Atlanta Constitution found that 71% of 1500 people 
polled supported criminal penalties for pregnant women whose drug use injured their infants. The 
survey also found that more women than men favored criminalization. Mark Curriden, Holding 
Mom Accountable, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 50, 51. 
17. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of 
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1462 (1991); AMA Bd. of 
Trustees, supra note 4, at 2663, 2667; Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. 
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Several critics viewed the problem as a conflict between fetal rights and 
maternal rights and argued that the effect of criminal intervention was 
to elevate the fetus to the status of a "person."18 
Opponents and proponents of criminalization agree, however, that 
the most effective solution to the problem of prenatal drug use is drug 
treatment and rehabilitation.19 They also recognize that either the 
pregnant drug user lacks the motivation to seek drug treatment or 
treatment programs are unavailable or unaffordable.2° For the pregnant 
drug user, then, the "just say no" command is a pitiless and inane 
response. 
This Article argues that governmental intervention is appropriate 
to address both the motivation to seek treatment and the availability of 
treatment programs. This intervention should involve the criminal jus-
WOMEN's LJ. 278, 284 (1990); Michele D. Wilkins, Comment, SoMng the Problem of Prenatal 
Substance Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitati~·e Approaches, 39 EMORY LJ 1401 
(1990) (recommending prenatal care, education, and drug treatment for pregnant addicts instead 
of punitive measures). 
18. See., e.g., Kristen Barrett, Prosecuting Pregnant Addicts for Dealing to the Unborn, 33 
ARiz. L. REv. 221, 227-34 (1991); Robert Holland, Note, Criminal Sanctions For Drug Abuse 
During Pregnancy: The Antithesis of Fetal Health, 8 N.Y.L ScH. J. HUI·L Rts. 415 (1991); 
Doretta M. McGinnis, Comment, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitu-
tional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 505 (1990); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal 
Wrongs: The Case Against Criminalization of Fetal Abuse, 101 HARV L. REV 994 (1988)[herc-
inafter Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs]; Tiffany M. Romney, Comment, Prosecuting 
Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 325, 332-33 (1991); Joyce L Terrcs, Prena-
tal Cocaine Exposure: How Should the Government lnten·ene?, 18 A.~L J, Cru~L L 61, 71-73 
(1990); see also Louise B. Wright, Comment, Fetus vs. Mother: Criminal liability for Maternal 
Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 36 WAYNE L REv. 1285, 1290 (1990) (arguing that crimi-
nal sanctions would be constitutional but ineffective). 
19. See, e.g., Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 18, at 995 ("[E]ducating women 
and funding adequate prenatal care are better approaches to the problem •••• "); Lisa J. Keyes, 
Comment, Rethinking the Aim of the 'War on Drugs': States' Roles in Prn·enting Substance 
Abuse by Pregnant Women, 1992 W1s. L REv. 197, 230-32; Note, Rethinking Motherhood: Fem-
inist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L REv. 1325, 1342 (1990) (recom-
mending birth control education and access to contraception and abortion as well as prenatal 
care); Elizabeth L. Thompson, Note, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct During Preg-
nancy: A Decisionmaking Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND. LJ. 357, 370 (1989) (arguing that 
criminalization will discourage women from seeking prenatal care out of fear or self-incrimina-
tion); AMA Bd. of Trustees, supra note 4, at 2668. 
Based on the continuing availability of illegal drugs, it may be argued that law enforcement 
is ineffective at its primary task. Ethan A. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States: 
Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives, 245 Sc1. 939, 943 (1989). "llegal drug usc declined 39 
percent between 1985 and 1988, but the decline slowed to 15 percent between 1988 and 1991," 
according to a report issued by the Drug Policy Foundation. Associated Press, Drug War is Called 
a Sham; Bush Aide Says Charge Hollow, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 4. 1992, at A12. 
20. See Keyes, supra note 19, at 232 (arguing that pregnant women usc drugs because they 
lack either incentives or resources to stop using drugs). 
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tice system and the social services system. The criminal justice system, 
which is currently a "disincentive" to prenatal care and drug treat-
ment, could become an "incentive" for the drug user to seek care and 
treatment. This transformation is possible through the use of 
prosecutorial immunity.21 Such immunity should be granted to prenatal 
drug users for all offenses based on the evidence of a drug-affected in-
fant who participate in treatment programs. The social services system 
should provide the user the "means" by which to obtain this immunity, 
by expanding and establishing prenatal and postpartum drug treatment 
facilities. Part II of this Article describes the effects of prenatal drug 
use, including the harm to the infant and the economic cost to society. 
Part III outlines a proposed solution which provides the pregnant drug 
user with both the resources and the incentive to stop using drugs. This 
solution includes criminal sanctions, under existing drug use statutes, 
as a "last resort" for mothers who refuse to participate in available 
treatment programs. Part IV evaluates the constitutionality of these 
criminal sanctions. 
II. EFFECTS OF PRENATAL DRUG USE 
Although disagreement exists on the most appropriate means to 
resolve the problem, the devastating effects of prenatal drug use on in-
fants and society are beyond dispute. An understanding of these effects 
is essential to the development of an effective solution to prenatal drug 
use. This section describes the consequences to both the infant and 
society. 
Drug exposure has seriously harmful physiological effects on the 
21. Prosecutorial immunity is a promise of nonprosecution. This immunity would prohibit the 
state from using the mother's prenatal drug use, or the infant's positive drug screen, as evidence in 
a subsequent prosecution. The scope of this nonstatutory immunity would be determined by the 
state. Use and derivative-use immunity would preclude prosecution based on prenatal drug evi-
dence and any other evidence directly or indirectly derived from the prenatal drug use. Transac-
tional immunity would bar prosecution for any transaction or matter relating to the prenatal drug 
use. Together, these immunities would sufficiently insure that a mother's prenatal drug use would 
not "lead to the infliction of criminal penalties." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 
(1972). Because prosecutorial immunity would be provided through an agreement, rather than a 
formal court order, the state may be able to tailor the scope of the immunity to the case. See 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 8.11, at 393-97 (1984). 
Immunity has been suggested, but not explored, by at least one other commentator. See 
James Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment for Maternal 
Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1104, 1139 (1991) ("One alternative means of motivating 
addict mothers to take positive steps to protect their unborn children, at least where illicit sub-
stances are concerned, would be to offer ... the promise of immunity from drug prosecution upon 
submitting to voluntary prenatal care."). 
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newborn infant. When ingested by pregnant women, drugs enter a fe-
tus' body through the mother's bloodstream. The drugs may cause fetal 
high blood pressure, premature birth, low birth weight, and birth de-
fects. Prenatal cocaine exposure can also cause neurological impair-
ment.22 Some drug-affected infants are born with missing or shriveled 
limbs due to poor blood circulation.23 Many drug-exposed infants are 
also infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, because their 
mothers contracted the disease through intravenous drug use.24 
Cocaine is especially dangerous to the fetus if it is used during the 
first three months of pregnancy, when the brain and other organs are 
developing.25 Cocaine constricts the mother's blood vessels and reduces 
the blood flow to the fetus through the placenta. By reducing the sup-
ply of blood to the fetus, cocaine deprives the fetus of oxygen.20 The 
22. Barry Zuckerman, Drug-Exposed Infants: Understanding the Medical Risk, FUTURE OF 
CmLDREN, Spring 1991, at 26, 29-31; see also Barry Zuckerman ct al., Effects of Maternal 
Marijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal Growth, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 762 (1989) [hereinafter 
Zuckerman et al., Fetal Growth] (correlating cocaine use during pregnancy with imp:~ircd fetal 
growth and smaller head circumference). 
23. Christy Scatterella, Forced Birth Controi?-Drug Baby Boom Sparks Call to Control 
Female Addicts, SEA TILE TIMES, June 24, 1991, at AI. Pregnant women who take drugs can also 
cause their babies to have strokes in the uterus. Romney, supra note 18, at 328. For a list of 
medical and obstetrical complications that occur when pregnant women take drugs, sec Loretta P. 
Fmnegan & Ronald J. Wapner, Drug Abuse in Pregnancy, MED. TIMES, Oct. 1983, at 4FM, 
6FM-7FM; Judith Larsen et a!., Medical Evidence in Cases of Intrauterine Drug and Alcohol 
Exposure, 18 PEPP. L REv. 279 (1991). 
24. Some infants are not drug exposed, but arc infected with AIDS or the HIV virus. In most 
cases, however, infants with AIDS are also drug-exposed. James R. Coo~r. Methadone Treat-
ment and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 262 JAMA 1664, 1667 (1989); Vincent P. 
Dole, Methadone Treatment and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Epidemic, 262 
JAMA 1681 (1989) (editorial). Unfortunately, the physical suffering for these infants b:gins at 
birth and ends at death. In 1988, the March of Dimes declared AIDS the nation's fastest-growing 
birth defect and campaigned to encourage women who may be infected to get tested for AIDS 
before they become pregnant. The campaign slogan was "A baby with AIDS is born d)ing." Peg 
Byron, AIDS Babies; Your Health: Treating the Youngest and Fastest Growing Group of AIDS 
Sufferers, UPI, Feb. 27, 1988, a~·ai/ab/e in LEXIS, Nc.'\is Library, UPI File; see also Rex 
Greene, M.D., Towards a Policy of Mercy: Addiction in the 1990s, 1991 STAN. L & PoL'Y REv. 
227, 231 (outlining data that suggest the spread of neonatal AIDS through intra\·enous drug usc). 
25. For studies detailing the effects of cocaine on the developing fetus, sec Ira J. ChasnoiT, 
Drug Use in Pregnancy: Parameters of Risk, 35 PEDIATRIC CUNICS OF N. A!.t 1403, 1406-07 
(1988); Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use In Early Pregnancy: Perinatal 
Outcome, 261 JAMA 1741 (1989); Gilberto F. Chavez, Maternal Cocaine Use in Early Preg-
nancy as a Ri'sk Factor for Congenital Urogenital Abnormalities, 262 JAMA 795 (1989); Kathe-
rine Kaye et al., Birth Outcomes for Infants of Drug Abusing Mothers, 89 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 256 
(1989); Louis G. Keith et al., Substance Abuse in Pregnant Women: Recent Experience at the 
Perinatal Center for Chemical Dependence of Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 13 ORSTETRics 
& GYNECOLOGY 715 (1989). 
26. See Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 666, 668 
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consequences of decreased fetal oxygenation include prenatal strokes, 
premature births, growth retardation, injury to the central nervous sys-
tem, and congenital malformations.27 
Drug-exposed infants often have serious behavioral or emotional 
problems. Many become hyperactive, causing frustration for their par-
ents. The added stress of caring for the drug-exposed child may cause 
the parents to physically abuse or simply neglect the child.28 Even if 
the child is not abused or physiologically harmed, prenatal drug use 
increases the risk of a poor maternal-infant relationship. A drug-abus-
ing mother may be unable to care for a normal child. The relationship 
may be so detrimental to the child that it is difficult to determine 
whether the child's unusual behavior results from the biological effects 
of prenatal drug exposure or poor parenting.29 
Many drug-exposed infants are born into troubled families with 
histories of abuse and neglect. An estimated 675,000 children, a figure 
which includes children who managed to escape prenatal exposure, are 
abused or neglected each year due to drugs.30 According to one study, 
the correlation between substance abuse and child abuse or neglect by 
the substance abuser may be as high as eighty-three percent.31 More.: 
over, the cycle frequently continues with neglected or abused children 
eventually becoming drug-using and child-abusing parents.32 
(1985); Zuckerman et at., Fetal Growth, supra note 22, at 766. 
27. See Chasnoff, supra note 26, at 668-69. Minor neurological abnormalities may cause scri· 
ous learning and behavior disabilities. Even newborns without birth defects or neurological abnor· 
malities may experience withdrawal symptoms like seizures, eating difficulties, trembling, or lcth· 
argy. Larsen et al., supra note 23, at 291-96; AMA Bd. of Trustees, supra note 4, at 2666. 
28. Rhode Island medical examiners determined that continued cocaine use by the parents of 
a seven-week-old child led to the child's death from malnutrition and dehydration. William Q. 
Sturner et al., Cocaine Babies: The Scourge of the '90's, 36 J. FORENSIC Sci. 35, 36·37 (1991), 
29. The addicted mother typically leads a disorganized, chaotic life which is not conducive to 
providing predictable and positive experiences that newborns require to develop normally. See 
Douglas J. Besharov, Whose Life Is It, Anyway? Pregnant Crack Users Act as Child Abusers, 
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 1991, at IS. Moreover, drug use impairs a mother's judgment and may cause 
her to physically abuse her children. A Ramsey County, Minnesota, Department of Human Ser· 
vices study found that parents who use cocaine are "extremely volatile with episodes of 'normal' 
behavior interspersed with episodes of unpredictable, dangerous and even violent behavior." I d. at 
16. In 1989, 70% of the child-abuse fatalities that occurred in families serviced by New York 
City's child protective agency were drug related. /d. 
30. Leo Uzych, The Problem of Drug Babies, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 10, 1990, at 18; 
see also Rebecca Black & Joseph Mayer, Parents With Special Problems: Alcoholism and Opiate 
Addiction, in THE BATTERED CHILD 104, 104-12 (C. Henry Kempe & Ray Helfer eds., 3d ed. 
1980) (discussing child abuse among parents with opiate and alcohol addictions). 
31. Robert W. ten Bensel, Assessing the Dynamics of Child Neglect and Abuse, Juv. & FAM. 
CT. J., Winter 1984-85, at 33, 37. 
32. Haldane, supra note 3, at Bl. Pregnant drug users are frequently involved in abusive 
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The economic costs associated with drug-exposed infants provide a 
benchmark for the money that could be saved by preventing prenatal 
drug use. Caring for these infants is expensive. Moreover, the expenses 
fall not only on public and private health care systems, but also on 
foster care programs, social service systems and public school systems. 
The public costs of caring for these infants could soon reach $50 mil-
lion to $100 million a year.33 
The most expensive medical costs are for neonatal intensive care. 
Twenty-five percent of drug-exposed newborns need intensive care for 
several months. Such care can cost between $24,750 and $100,000 per 
infant.34 Cocaine-exposed infants have more physiological problems, 
and their medical care is more expensive than the care needed by other 
drug-exposed infants. Cocaine-exposed babies are fifty percent more 
likely to require intensive care and twice as likely to have very low 
birth weights, costing the country more than $500 million a year in 
hospital and delivery care alone.3G The additional cost for delivery and 
care of crack-exposed babies is over $11,000 per infant.36 The medical 
expenses for these children, which begin at birth and continue to age 
eighteen, may be as much as $750,000. Because these children are 
often uninsured, the government is forced to pay most of these medical 
relationships, and their "vulnerability to physical abuse may stem from a history of bdng abused 
as children." Amin N. Daghestani, Psychosocial Characrerislics of Pregnanl Women Addicrs in 
Treatmenl, in DRUGS, ALCOHOL. PREGNANCY AND PARENTING, 7, 11 (Ira J. ChasnoiT ed., 1988). 
Between 74% and 90% of female drug users have been victims of sexual abuse, rape. or incest. 
See Renee M. Popovits, Criminalization of Pregnanl Subsrance Abusers: A Heallh Care Perspec-
tive, 24 J. HEALTH & HosP. L.. June 1991, at 169, 172 (discussing studies on drug-dc~ndent 
women and reports from the few drug abuse programs that treat pregnant women). 
33. "The cost in medical care, foster care and special education for these children could reach 
$50 million to $100 million a year .•.• " Jean Latz Griffin & Teresa Wiltz, Schools' Newest 
Burden: Cocaine Babies, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1991, at 1. In 1989, the federal go'lernmcnt targeted 
only S4.5 million for model projects intended to aid pregnant alcohol- and drug-dcp:ndent women. 
Sherman, supra note 2, at 28. 
34. FernS. Chapman, We'll Pay N01v or We'll Pay Later, USA TODA'\', Jan. 9, 1990, at A6; 
Retha Hill, Mothers and Babies Doing Well at Md. Center for Drug Abusers, WASIL POST, Feb. 
10, 1992, at D3. 
35. The American Medical Association estimates the hospital cxp:nses for lnbies born to 
cocaine-addicted mothers is $504 million a year more than the hospital cx~nses for healthy ba-
bies. Associated Press, Care of Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1991, at 84. This figure dotS not 
include subsequent health and social services costs required to help cocaine-exposed children "cope 
with the damage sustained before birth." The Cost of Not Prel·enting Crack Babies, N.Y TIMES, 
Oct. 10, 1991, at A26 (editorial). 
36. The Cost of Not Preventing Crack Babies, supra note 35, at A26. For additional statisti-
cal information on the cost of delivery and care for cocaine-exposed infants, see Uzych, supra note 
30, at 18, and John Dillin, U.S. Wasting Funds in Drug Effort, CHRISTIAN So. Mo:-nTOR, June 
12, 1991, at 8. 
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bills.37 
Ill. DRUG TREATMENT AND PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY 
The alarming predictions of a "prenatal drug epidemic" have gen-
erated a number of proposed governmental responses. Many are hu-
mane and rehabilitative.38 Others are shockingly inhumane and 
punitive. 39 
The problem with many of these responses is that they fail to con-
sider the reasons why pregnant women use drugs and avoid prenatal 
care and available drug treatment. Although there is no simple expla-
nation for prenatal drug use, it exists in large part because the expec-
tant mother has neither the ability nor the motivation to stop ~sing 
drugs. An appropriate and effective response, therefore, must ·address 
this lack of "ability" and "motivation." The harmful consequences of 
punitive sanctions40 could be avoided if the pregnant drug user had an 
opportunity to participate in prenatal care and drug treatment pro-
grams, and a realistic motivational "carrot"-the assurance of immu-
nity from prosecution upon successful completion of the drug treatment 
program. 
The trend toward legislation with only criminal sanctions indicates 
the need for a balanced, reasoned response to the problem of drug-
exposed infants. State intervention should be designed to protect drug-
affected children from immediate physiological harm and any potential 
post-hospitalization harm, and to protect society from the mother's ille-
37. Another study estimates the medical costs per child, for the first four years of raising a 
drug addicted baby, are over $40,000. Dillin, supra note 36, at 8. A recent study by the U.S. 
Census Bureau also disclosed that "one American in four lacks continuous health-insurance cover· 
age" and "hispanics, blacks, the young and city dwellers were more likely to spend at least a 
month without health insurance" during the 28-month period studied by the Census Bureau. More 
than half of those without insurance had no health insurance for more than 12 months of the 28· 
month study. Associated Press, One in Four Lacks Health Insurance, RICHMOND TIMES·DIS· 
PATCH, June 25, 1992, at Al3. 
38. Several states enacted statutes establishing identification and referral procedures or treat· 
ment programs for prenatal drug and alcohol users. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26·4· 
508.2 (West Supp. 1992); Maine Substance Abuse and Treatment Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 
5, §§20001-20044 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 19.07(a)(2), (b)(3) (Consol. 
Supp. 1991). 
39. "I know it sounds harsh, ... but I think we should offer these mothers a week's supply of 
free drugs if they would let us take out their uterus [sic]" was the recommendation of a neonatal 
intensive care nurse at a Detroit Hospital. Tom Hundley, Infants: A Growing Casualty of the 
Drug Epidemic, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 1989, at I. 
40. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 17, at 288; Lynn M. Paltrow, 'Fetal Abuse': Should We Rec-
ognize it as a Crime?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 38, 39. 
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gal drug use and its economic consequences. This response should be 
independent of and immaterial to the legal status of the fetus. The gov-
ernment should recognize that the problem of prenatal drug use is both 
a public health problem and a criminal drug use problem. Thus, the 
solution to such a problem must broadly address the medical, social, 
and legal issues associated with drug dependence and prenatal drug ex-
posure. As part of such a solution, states must find the resources 
needed for prenatal services and drug treatment programs that meet 
the specific needs of the pregnant drug user. 
Intensive drug abuse education and treatment programs must not 
only be made available and accessible, but must also be utilized by 
pregnant drug users. While accepting the view that prenatal treatment 
programs are the best solution, several experts doubt that pregnant ad-
dicts would voluntarily enroll in such programs.41 These experts believe 
that addicts, and some drug-using non-addicts, cannot act responsibly 
and will not voluntarily seek treatment.42 
An effective response must, therefore, include governmental coer-
cion. The expectant mother should have a strong incentive to partici-
pate in drug treatment: prosecutorial immunity. She must be en-
couraged to select treatment and participate in available programs, or 
else risk prosecution for her prenatal ingestion of illegal drugs. 
Punitive solutions to the prenatal drug use problem should be 
avoided, if possible, and pregnant drug users should not be punished 
merely because they give birth to drug-affected infants.43 However, 
drug users who refuse to participate in available treatment programs 
should not be immune from prosecution for their criminal conduct. 
These drug users have possessed and used drugs, in violation of existing 
41. The former director of the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect stated, "Cases 
like these [children battered by drug addicted parents] lead to proposals to cxp:~nd treatment 
services for crack-addicted mothers. But at least for now, such services would prob:lbly make little 
difference. Crack addicts typically show little or no interest in prenatal care and are unlikely to 
seek it until very late in their pregnancy, if ever •..• [A]n cxp:~nsion of drug-treatment services 
for women is long overdue but unlikely to produce quick or substantial results." Douglas J. 
Besharov, Crack Babies: The Worst Threat is Mom Herself, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1989, at 81. 
42. Prenatal drug users may refuse to participate in available substance abuse treatment pro-
grams simply because they fail to see the need for treatment or because penal sanctions are too 
speculative. Ira J. Chasnoff, President of the National Association of Perinatal Addiction Re-
search and Education, believes "drug-using individuals are not reality-b:lscd and have strong de-
nial mechanisms. They tell themselves they will never be caught." Punishing Pregnant Addicts: 
Debate, Dismay, No Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1989, at 05. 
43. For discussions of the policy arguments against prosecuting mothers of drug addicted in-
fants, see, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 18; Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 18; 
Wilkins, supra note 17; Wright, supra note 18. 
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drug-possession and drug-use statutes."" Prosecutors should only charge 
those offenders who refuse to participate in available drug abuse treat-
ment programs.45 All other offenders should be granted immunity. 
To encourage participation in prenatal and drug treatment pro-
grams, (1) the availability and accessibility of programs must increase; 
(2) all disclosures by pregnant drug users to medical personnel should 
be covered by the physician-patient confidentiality privilege; and (3) 
drug users who have not been granted immunity must be prosecuted. 
A. Availability of Drug Treatment Programs for Pregnant Drug 
Users 
Regardless of the incentive, or concern about the unborn child, 
pregnant drug addicts can rarely resist the urge to use drugs.46 Without 
treatment, "addicted women of reproductive age will continue to use 
drugs and will continue to bear children.""' Prenatal care and drug 
treatment programs are therefore an essential component of an effec-
tive solution to the problem. Currently, drug treatment programs for 
pregnant drug users are almost non-existent.48 States need to expand . 
44. Drug users should not be charged with child abuse solely because they give birth to drug 
affected infants. Evidence of an infant's positive toxicology screen should be followed by further 
assessment to determine whether the infant is at risk of abuse or neglect. A positive toxicology 
screen, however, is sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of drug possession and use. See, 
e.g., Children of Substance Abusers: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Children, Fami-
lies, Drugs. and Alcoholism, Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 63, 
64 (1990) (statement of Kary L. Moss, staff attorney, ACLU) (toxicology screens reveal drugs 
ingested within 72 hours prior to the screen); see also People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1991) (Reilly, J., concurring) ("The defendant may properly have been charged with 
possession of cocaine .... However, the use of controlled substances by a pregnant woman, 
without more, does not support the additional charge of delivery to another .... "). 
45. See Shona B. Glink, Note, The Prosecution of Maternal Fetal Abuse: Is This the An-
swer?, 2 U. ILL. L. REv. 533, 577-78 (1991) (stating that pregnant drug users should be prose-
cuted only if rehabilitation programs are inadequate or unavailable; women who are "turned 
away" should not be prosecuted). 
46. "I knew every time I picked up that drug that I was taking a risk of harming my baby. 
But the need for that drug was so great." Michael Massing, The Two William Bennetts, N.Y. 
REv. OF BooKs, Mar. I, 1990, at 29 (statement of a drug user forced to give up her child due to 
her addiction). See Wendy K. Mariner et al., Pregnancy, Drugs and Perils of Prosecution, 9 
CRIM. JusT. ETHICS 30, 36 (1990); AMA Bd. of Trustees, supra note 4, at 2667 ("Substance 
abuse is caused by complex hereditary, environmental, and social factors. Individuals who are 
substance dependent have impaired competence in making decisions about the use of that 
substance."). 
47. Michelle Oberman, Sex. Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of 
Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 547 {1992). 
48. Over one million drug addicts are seeking drug abuse treatment in the United States, but 
facilities are simply unavailable. Andrew H. Malcolm, In Making Drug Strategy, No Accord on 
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existing residential and non-residential substance abuse facilities and 
open new facilities.49 More importantly, every licensed substance abuse 
treatment facility should be required to give priority admissions to 
pregnant drug users. 
Additional funding is needed from private and public sources to 
expand existing treatment programs and create additional programs.llo 
The obvious governmental response to this request is that additional 
public funding is simply unavailable.ll1 However, funds currently allo-
cated for law enforcement and funds obtained from drug forfeitures 
could be diverted to programs for pregnant drug users. 112 
Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. I9, I989, §I, at I. A 1989 New York study found that of 78 pro-
grams in the city, 87% excluded pregnant crack addicts on Medicaid, 67% excluded pregnant 
women on Medicaid, and 54% denied admission to all pregnant women. Shennan, supra note 2. 
at I; see also Sherman, supra note 7, at 3. Moreover, even if programs did admit pregnant 
women, access may be "limited by an addict's financial status and also by less predictable vari-
ables such as luck and perseverance." Oberman, supra note 47, at 517. 
49. The New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services estimated that in 1990 there 
were more than 500,000 drug abusers in New York City. Treatment was available for only 
42,000. Moreover, "[t]hings are even worse for pregnant drug abusers, who traditionally have 
been turned away from treatment." Felicia R. lee, Pregnant Drug Abusers Find Hope in Pro-
gram, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1990, at B3. 
50. Unfortunately, most of the prenatal drug users must depend on public facilities for prena-
tal care and drug treatment. Two-thirds of the women of childbearing age have no health insur-
ance, and one-fourth lack health insurance for maternity care. Oberman, supra note 47, at 544. 
51. This response is simply unacceptable. The federal government reportedly sp~nt S1 billion a 
day in the Mideast during the Persian Gulf crisis, yet spends only S3 billion a year on drug 
treatment and prevention. David Berreby, Redefining Recorery from Addiction, NEWSOAY, Feb. 
18, I991, at 37 (interview with David Condliffe, Chief, N.Y. Office on Drug Abuse Policy). 
52. Treatment programs could also be supported by "tax proceeds" from a "tax" on illegal 
drug sales. State legislation taxing drug sales was one of five recommendations addressing the 
penalties imposed for drug trafficking in a report to the states published by the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy in November 1990. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CO~"TROL Pouc-.·. WmTE 
PAPER. STATE DRUG CONTROL STATUS REPORT (Nov. 1990) This legislation would "sp~ the 
progress and ensure the success of America's anti-drug efforts." /d. at 1. At least 28 states have 
statutes which authorize the collection of "taxes" from defendants who sell or possess controlled 
substances. (Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Neo.'llda, Neo.v Mexico, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming tax drug sales. /d. at app. See, e.g., KAK STAT, M'N- § 79-5201 
(1989).). Minnesota collected almost Sl.S million in four years from its drug sales tax. OFFICE OF 
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POUCY, supra, at 12. 
A tax statute does not legalize drug sales or possession, but in theory requires drug possessors 
to purchase tax stamps to place on the drugs. The state may collect the tax from those with 
unstamped drugs or charge the defendant with tax evasion in addition to the illegal drug charge. 
The tax may average from $200 to $300 per gram of cocaine or heroin. /d. 
States with no drug "tax" should consider "taxing" drug sales and allocating the "tax pro-
ceeds" for treatment programs for pregnant users. 
States should also consider mandatory cash penalties for drug offenders. New Jersey collects 
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The forfeiture laws create a pool of funds to assist in the costs of 
drug enforcement. It makes sense to use that same pool of funds for 
drug treatment, which is an essential component of the "demand side" 
of the drug enforcement efforts. Indeed, money spent for drug treat· 
ment may be more cost effective than money spent in the investigation 
or prosecution of drug offenses. A 1990 congressional report cited a 
study suggesting that each dollar invested in drug treatment saves soci· 
ety five dollars in reduced crime and welfare costs.113 
Moreover, the success and cost effectiveness of treatment has been 
documented in the few existing prenatal drug treatment programs. A 
Baltimore, Maryland prenatal residential center found that few drug· 
exposed infants born at the center required intensive care and that the 
intensive care costs at the center were $8640 per child, while the same 
costs at other medical facilities were $24,750 per child.114 At the Chi-
cago Northwestern Memorial Hospital, seventy percent of the partici-
pants in the prenatal substance abuse program delivered drug-free in· 
fants. 1111 In New York City, two programs treated approximately fifteen 
hundred pregnant addicts and new mothers of cocaine-exposed babies 
in 1991. In seventy-five percent of these cases, "the children of these 
women would, absent the treatment, have been referred for foster 
care."116 The city realized a one-year foster care savings of $22.7 mil-
lion for the two programs, and a cumulative four-year savings of more 
than $250 million.117 Because these prenatal treatment centers can be 
a mandatory cash penalty, which has averaged $9 million a year, from charged drug offenders 
who want pretrial diversion and from convicted drug offenders. For convicted offenders, the pen· 
alty is imposed at sentencing, in addition to any other fine. Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:3S·I5 (West 
Supp. 1992). The range of the cash penalty begins at $500 for drug possession and extends to 
$3000 for more serious drug offenses. This money is specifically earmarked for public·awareness 
initiatives and prevention and education programs established to decrease the demand side of the 
drug crisis. /d.; OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra, at 12; see a/so State V. 
Bulu, 560 A.2d 1250, 1254 (N.J. 1989) (holding that the New Jersey penalty, which serves a 
"general rehabilitative or preventative function," may be constitutionally imposed on pretrial 
detainees). 
53. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, l01ST CONG., 2D SESS., HARD·CORil CO· 
CAINE ADDICTS: MEASURING AND FIGHTING-THE EPIDEMIC, at v (Comm. Print 1990) (State• 
ment of Sen. Biden, Chairman of the Judiciary Comm.). 
54. The Center for Addiction and Pregnancy in Baltimore, a 16-bed residential treatment 
center, cost $2.5 million. The state contributed $800,000 in start-up money and added $250,000 in 
early 1992. Within the first ten months, 43 of 48 babies born at the center went home without · 
neonatal intensive care. Nationally, 25% of babies born to drug-using mothers remain hospital· 
ized for neonatal care. Hill, supra note 34, at D3. 
55. Wilkins, supra note 17, at 1440. 
56. The Cost of Not Treating Crack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1991, at A18 (editorial). 
57. /d. 
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relatively inexpensive to operate,58 and because treatment works, state 
and federal governments must increase the availability of treatment 
programs for pregnant drug users. 
B. Confidentiality of Disclosures about Prenatal Drug Use 
Prenatal care is essential to a healthy pregnancy and a healthy 
child.59 Prenatal care will reduce not only the risk of fetal injuries but 
also the health care expenses of drug-exposed infants and their 
mothers. The health care costs for the pregnant cocaine user who does 
not receive prenatal care and her cocaine-affected newborn average 
$31,000.60 The health care costs for a cocaine user who receives prena-
tal care and her newborn are approximately $7000.01 
Pregnant drug users, who have a more acute need for medical at-
tention, rarely receive prenatal care. These women may be reported to 
government authorities if they seek medical services or drug counseling 
from public health practitioners.62 If one purpose of the government's 
response is to "motivate" the drug user to seek help, the expectant 
mother should not be afraid to seek medical care. In fact, drug users 
may be more inclined to seek drug treatment during their pregnancies. 
The government should take advantage of this opportunity by main-
taining the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship through-
out the pregnancy. 
Public and private health care practitioners should screen pregnant 
women for substance _abuse. Moreover, health care practitioners must 
specifically question pregnant women about drug use. To encourage 
honest responses, and prenatal care generally, women must be given 
written and verbal confirmation assuring the confidentiality of their re-
58. The Los Angeles Baby Step Inn, a 12·bed residential center for female drug addicts who 
are either pregnant or raising children, asks residents to pay a monthly fee of S350. Women who 
cannot pay the fee are not turned away. In addition to income from the residents, the facility 
receives a $150,000 grant from the state. Haldane, supra note 3, at 81. 
59. Inadequate prenatal care is the major cause of high infant mortality rates. Infants born to 
women who received inadequate prenatal care are three times more likely to die prior to reaching 
their first birthday than infants whose mothers received adequate prenatal care. See Dana Hughes 
et a!., The Health of America's Mothers and Children: Trends in Access to Care, 20 CLEARING· 
HOUSE REV. 472, 473 (1986). 
60. Missing Links: Coordinating Federal Drug Polley for Women, Infants and Children: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Go~·ernmental Affairs, l01st Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1989) 
(statement of Dr. Ira J. Chasnoff, President, National Association on Perinatal Addiction Re-
search and Education). 
61. Id. 
62. Jacqueline Berrien, Pregnancy and Drug Use: The Dangerous and Unequal Use of Puni-
tive Measures, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINlSM 239, 247 (1990). 
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sponses. If practitioners identify a need for treatment and services, they 
should advise the patient of available substance abuse programs. Pa-
tients should also be advised that prosecutorial immunity is granted 
prenatal drug users who complete drug treatment programs. 
Public and private hospitals should have protocols for discharging 
mothers of drug-exposed infants. These mothers and their infants must 
be referred to appropriate professionals for postpartum treatment ser-
vices.63 They must receive priority attention from the appropriate 
health and social services agencies, and their care must be monitored 
throughout the treatment process. 
C. Prosecuting Mothers Who Refuse to Participate in Available 
Drug Treatment Programs 
My proposal requires the mother of a drug-exposed infant or fetus 
to either participate in an available treatment and rehabilitation pro-
gram or agree to participate in a program when one becomes available, 
to avoid criminal prosecution.64 Opponents of state intervention might 
argue that the state should not require anyone, even persons suspected 
of criminal activity, to enter a drug treatment program. However, the 
scope of the prenatal drug use problem requires state intervention. The 
extent of harm to the fetus is undetected until the birth of the infant. 
Until that time state involvement is not justified. When drug exposure 
is documented after the birth of the infant, however, the "harm" to 
society and the infant exists, and the state has a compelling interest in 
"coercing" the mother to take needed action to help herself and any 
future children. 
63. In addition to medical services, mothers of drug exposed infants may need housing, child 
care, transportation, or other services. See AMA Bd. of Trustees, supra note 4, at 2668 ("lmpor· 
tant methods for preventing or minimizing fetal harm due to substance abuse by pregnant women 
include identification of women who are at high risk for being substance abusers, ... and access 
to programs that address the full range of social and health care needs associated with substance 
abuse."). 
64. Participation alone is sufficient, rather than successful completion of program. Successful 
completion is not required because it may not occur during the nine-month pregnancy period. 
However, some level of participation, which includes "substantial" attendance, is necessary to 
receive immunity. The goal of this proposal is to rehabilitate drug-using mothers and to protect 
the health of the potential child. The program administrators should be able to determine whether 
a participant has been meaningfully involved in the treatment process. Critics may claim that the 
majority of risks to the fetus occur within the first few months of pregnancy and, therefore, treat· 
ment after this period is not essential to protecting the health of the fetus. However, the "fetal 
brain develops rapidly in the last two months of pregnancy, and a pregnant woman's ... drug 
abuse is especially harmful to the fetus at this time." Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective 
Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 88-89 (1984). 
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Given the existing burdens on the criminal justice system, an ini-
tial inquiry suggested by this proposal is why any mother should be 
prosecuted. The obvious answer is that a criminal offense has been 
committed. The government may rightfully punish the mother who 
used drugs, not because she had a child but because she engaged in 
criminal conduct. The legal rationale for these prosecutions should be 
the illegality of drug use alone, i.e., the same rationale for punishing 
drug-using men and women who have not given birth to drug-affected 
infants. 65 The government can use any admissible evidence against 
these drug users, and should also use any admissible evidence against 
drug-using mothers of drug-exposed infants. 
My proposal also requires mandatory reporting of all drug-exposed 
newborn infants. Several states have passed legislation that requires 
hospitals to perform toxicology screens on all newborns and report posi-
tive results to child welfare authorities.66 Many hospitals also interpret 
state child abuse reporting laws to require reports of positive results.67 
Positive test results could lead to "drug use" charges against 
mothers who have not been granted immunity because of their failure 
65. or equal import, however, is the danger that a lack of punitive sanctions may lead to 
additional offenses, such as child abuse or neglect. Moreover, a woman is far more likely to ha\·e 
two or more drug-exposed children. Scattarella, supra note 23, at AI; Hugo Martin, Program 
Weans Mothers, Unborn Babies From Drugs, LA TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, at 81. 
66. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846(A)(2) (West Supp. 1992) ("Every physician or 
surgeon ... attending the birth of a child who appears to be a child born in a condition of 
dependence on a controlled dangerous substance shall promptly report the matter to the county 
office of the Department of Human Services ..•. "); see also MASS. GEN LAws ANN. ch. 119, 
§ 51A (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CooE ANN. 
§ 62A-4-504 (1989). Prenatal drug use, as evidenced by positive toxicology screens, is subject to 
mandatory child abuse reporting statutes in at least eight states. See Holland, supra note 18, at 
437; Sherman, supra note 7, at 10. 
67. Newborn toxicology screens can be conducted without parental consent. See Rorie Sher-
man, Keeping Baby Safe from Mom, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 3, 1988, at 1, 24. 
For a discussion of the constitutional and ethical issues raised by the screening of newborns, 
see Moss, supra note 17, at 292-96. Moss argues that drug screening disproportionately affects 
poor women and women of color, violates a woman's right to privacy, interferes with the physi-
cian-patient relationship, frightens expectant mothers from drug treatment and prenatal care pro-
grams, and "may not be in the best interests of the child given the current state of foster care in 
the United States." Id. at 294-96; see also Kary L. Moss, Drug Testing of Postpartum Women 
and Newborns as the Basis for Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 23 CLEARINGIIOUSE REV 1406, 
1409-13 (1990). 
These arguments are misplaced when used in the context of newborn screening b:~use only 
the newborn's results are reported. Moreover, there is no reporting of prenatal screens or the 
mother's postpartum screen, screens would be required at both prh-ate and public hospitals, and 
the compelling state interest in obtaining the results would outweigh any pri\-acy interest of the 
mother. See infra text accompanying notes 102-20. 
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to participate in drug treatment programs.68 Immunity should be 
granted to mothers who sought help, but were unable to receive treat-
ment because programs were unavailable or inaccessible. However, 
mothers who were not granted immunity and who refuse to participate 
in an available postpartum program should be prosecuted for their un-
lawful drug use, based on the positive toxicology screen.69 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
The scholarship on prenatal drug use raises several constitutional 
objections to any punitive response. Commentators claim that 
"criminalization" of prenatal drug use violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, the right to privacy, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.70 These arguments address pros-
ecutions based on existing drug trafficking statutes and proposed legis-
lation establishing the separate crime of prenatal drug use. The argu-
ments do not focus on the constitutionality of prosecutions under 
existing drug use or drug possession statutes. Opponents of "criminal-
ization" nonetheless conclude that any use of prenatal drug ingestion 
evidence against female defendants would be unconstitutional. These 
68. Several states have criminalized the ingestion as well as the possession of illegal drugs. For 
example, Michigan's statute provides: "A person shall not use a controlled substance unless the 
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner 
while acting in the course of the practitioner's professional practice." MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 333.7404(1) (West 1978). In Nevada, it is "unlawful for any person knowingly to use" a "con-
trolled substance except in accordance with a prescription [or] ... except when administered 
... at a rehabilitation clinic ... or a hospital .... "NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 453.411 (Michie 
1991). The applicable penalties in Michigan and Nevada are based on the classification of the 
drug as either a Schedule I, II, III, or IV substance. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4754 
(Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 37-2732 (Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, 
§ 2-405 (West Supp. 1992). 
Evidence of the mother's refusal to participate in a program is not relevant to the elements of 
the offense and would be inadmissible in subsequent criminal proceedings. If convicted, the 
mother could be subjected to the range of penalties designated by the state for the "drug use" 
offense. . 
69. In many cases, the elements of the "use" offense and the location of the offense (venue) 
can be established by direct evidence, e.g, witnesses, mother's statements. In other cases, the of· 
fense and venue will be established by circumstantial evidence. For example, the positive toxicol-
ogy screen will indicate the amount of drugs ingested by the mother and the approximate time of 
the ingestion. Investigation may reveal the mother's residence or whereabouts during that time 
period. In addition, witnesses may be available who saw the mother with drug paraphernalia or 
under the influence of drugs during her pregnancy, or the age of needle marks or scarring may be 
useful in determining the location of the offense. 
70. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 18, at 997; Martha Field, Controlling the 
Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 114, 123-24 (1989); Holland supra 
note 18, at 440-42; Romney, supra note 18, at 339-40. 
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opponents, however, do not adequately address the issue of how courts 
should respond to these constitutional challenges. This section discusses 
the constitutionality of my proposal and concludes that it would be up-
held under all of the constitutional provisions mentioned above. 
A. Equal Protection 
Several scholars have assumed that prosecutions based on prenatal 
drug use are gender based and violate the Equal Protection Clause.71 
Because evidence of a newborn's positive toxicology screen is used only 
in cases against women, these scholars claim that women are punished 
because of their drug use and their ability to get pregnant.72 It is 
doubtful, however, that use of this evidence constitutes a gender-based 
classification.73 Moreover, even if it does, state action based on a gen-
der-based classification will be upheld if it serves "important govern-
mental objectives" and is "substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives. "74 
In Geduldig v. Aiello,715 the Supreme Court held that a pregnancy-
b.ased classification was not a gender-based classification. At issue in 
Geduldig was the constitutionality of a state disability insurance pro-
gram that did not cover pregnancy-related disabilities. Female employ-
ees who had been denied benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities ar-
71. See, e.g., Schiff, supra note 13, at 218-20. See generally Denison, supra note 21. 
72. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 1445. There is no conclusive evidence linking the positive 
screen to paternal drug use, even though several studies indicate that children or male cocaine 
users may have chromosome damage and abnormal development. See Ricardo A. Yazigi et al., 
Demonstration of Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human Spermatozoa, 266 JAMA 1956 (1991); 
Tim Friend, Sperm May Carry Cocaine to Egg, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 1991, at A1. 
73. See infra text accompanying notes 74-80. 
74. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). "To withstand constitutional challenge:, prC"oi-
ous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives 
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Jd. 
The Supreme Court has applied different levels of scrutiny in determining violations or the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Gender-based classifications receive an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny and are reviewed under the "substantial relationship" test. /d. Under this 
standard, the Supreme Court has invalidated statutes based on sexual stercotyp:s, but upheld 
statutes without sexual stereotypes which reasonably advance significant governmental interests. 
See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding military selective scnice act, which 
exempts women from the draft); Orr v. Orr. 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating law which allowed 
alimony payments only to wives from husbands). 
Constitutional challenges based on the right to privacy, which has been deemed a fundamen-
tal right, are reviewed under the "strict scrutiny" standard, the highest level of rC"oiew. See, e.g., 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). See also infra notes 97-99 and accomp:m)ing text 
(discussion of Roe v. Wade). 
75. 417 u.s. 484 (1974). 
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gued that the program constituted invidious gender discrimination. The 
Court noted that men and women had received benefits under the pro-
gram, and women had therefore benefitted from the state action. The 
Court then concluded that the state only discriminated against preg-
nant women, rather than all women. Because there was no evidence 
that the selection or risks covered by the disability program harmed all 
women-a definable group-the Court held there was no equal protec-
tion violation.76 
Several scholars criticized the Geduldig Court for failing to recog-
nize the obvious: discrimination based on pregnancy affects all women 
in the same "sex-specific way."77 By using "the male norm" to define 
"what constitutes sex-based inequality," the Court ignored the fact that 
non-pregnant women and men are not "similarly situated in their non-
pregnant status."78 However, the Court's reasoning was based solely on 
the realities of the biological process. Pregnancy is a unique physical 
condition. Although the Court failed to acknowledge that society's 
treatment of pregnancy affects gender equality, the Court's analysis in-
dicates that biologically based claims are less problematic than nonbio-
logical restrictions on women.79 This reasoning also supports the consti-
tutionality of prosecutorial immunity for prenatal drug users, which 
has a disparate effect on male drug users.80 
76. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 ("While it is true that only women can become pregnant, 
it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classifi· 
cation ... . ");see also Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that the State, in 
granting absolute lifetime preference to veterans applying for civil service positions, did not dis-
criminate against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
77. Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265, 281-82 (1984) (criticizing the Court's holding 
that disparate treatment based on pregnancy was not gender based as "outrageous"); Alice S. 
Andre-Clark, Note, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1933, 1941 (1992) (noting 
that the Court could never have a "pregnant man with whom to compare the treatment of prcg· 
nant women"). For a list of articles criticizing Geduldig, see Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the 
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 983 n.107 (1984). 
78. Ruth Colker, The Female Body and the Law: On Truth and Lies, 99 YALE L.J. 1159, 
1173-74 (1990) (reviewing ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW (1988)), 
Nearly all nonpregnant women have the capacity to become pregnant and are therefore affected 
by the action. Men are not directly affected by the policy, and childbearing decisions arc probably 
not as significant in their lives as they are in the lives of women. 
79. Speculating on how the Supreme Court would currently interpret pregnancy-based rcstric· 
tions leads to the conclusion that the Gedu/dig reasoning is consistent with the current theme in 
privacy cases, which acknowledges that such restrictions are "burdensome" but not "unduly bur-
densome." See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2819 (1992); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 105-10. 
80. Prosecutorial immunity serves the state's interest in protecting the health of the potential 
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Applying the Geduldig reasoning to the state's use of prenatal 
drug exposure evidence, a court would find that "pregnancy discrimina-
tion" is not invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protection 
clause. First, while the drug exposure evidence may be used against 
mothers of drug-affected babies, the criminal drug use statute pros-
cribes drug use by all men and women. Therefore, pregnant women 
suspected of drug use are not singled out for "special treatment" be-
cause they are pregnant. They are prosecuted because the state has 
reason to believe they use drugs. If medical technology subsequently 
determines that a newborn's positive toxicology screen indicates drug 
use by the father, such evidence could be used against fathers of drug-
affected babies. 
Secondly, if pregnant drug users are singled out for special treat-
ment, the state action does not single out all women for special treat-
ment. Use of the positiv_e toxicology screen against a female defendant 
only impacts women who give birth to drug-affected children, not all 
women. It has no impact on non-pregnant women who use drugs. Thus, 
under Geduldig, a gender-based classification cannot be established.81 
More importantly, even if a gender-based classification could be 
established, legislation that is not facially discriminatory does not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause unless enacted with a discriminatory 
motive.82 Women who are prosecuted are charged with drug use, a 
crime unrelated to their pregnancy or gender. Thus, the state action is 
not facially discriminatory. Without objective proof that a governmen-
baby by encouraging pregnant women to seek prenatal care and drug treatment. Drug treatment 
would also enhance "parental capacity for adequate child care." State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 
1140, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). For this reason, states may want to consider extending the 
immunity suggested in this Article to drug-using fathers of drug-exposed b:~bies. Fathers who 
successfully complete treatment programs prior to the birth of the b:~by may claim a constitu-
tional entitlement, on equal protection grounds, to immunity from prosecutions for drug use of-
fenses that occurred during the mother's pregnancy. However, the evidence of a drug-exposed 
baby can only be admitted in criminal cases against women. See supra text accomp30)ing note 
68. This potential criminal liability discourages drug-using women from obtaining needed health 
care and increases the health risks to both the mother and the potential baby. State v. Johnson, 
578 So. 2d 419, 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Sharp, J., dissenting), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 
(1992). In essence, neither the evidence establishing the crime nor the policy concerns underlying 
immunity are gender neutral. Thus, the grant of immunity need not be gender neutral. See 
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1981). 
81. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97. 
82. The Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), that pur-
poseful discrimination must be established by proving that the legislature acted "\~ith discrimina-
tory purpose" to harm women or that a gender-neutral action created a disparate impact on the 
basis of sex that can be categorized as per se intentional. !d. at 276. 
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tal approach adopted to curb this drug problem was intended to single 
out women, as a class, for discriminatory treatment, a court should not 
find the requisite discriminatory motive. 
Moreover, even a gender-based action with a discriminatory mo-
tive may pass the Court's current test for gender discrimination. Such 
actions trigger only intermediate scrutiny and, "[t]o withstand consti-
tutional challenge, . . . must serve important governmental objectives 
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."83 
Thus, if the state action serves an important state interest, it will be 
upheld even if it clearly singles out women for special treatment.84 
In Michael M. v. Supreme Court,85 the Court validated the use of 
a gender-based classification upholding a statutory rape law that pro-
hibited conduct by men only. The male defendant .claimed the law vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court recognized that teenage 
pregnancies had increased and that they have "particularly severe" so-
cial, medical, and economic consequences for the mother, her child, 
and the state.86 The Court also noted that legislative intent supporting 
the statutory rape statute was the desire to prevent illegitimate teenage 
pregnancies.87 The Court then found that the state's interest in prevent-
ing teenage pregnancies was sufficiently important to outweigh the dis-
criminatory impact of the statute.88 
The Court's decision in Michael M, like the Court's decision in 
Geduldig, generated a great deal of scholarly comment, including criti-
83. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
84. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). However, if the 
"means" the state uses to reach its objectives are inconsistent with the state interest, the Court 
may find that the state action was based on the "mechanical application of traditional, often 
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women." /d. at 725-26. 
85. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Michael M was decided by a sharply divided Court. Justice Rehn· 
quist wrote the plurality opinion, Justices Blackmun and Stewart wrote concurring opinions, and 
Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion. 
86. !d. at 470-72. 
87. /d. at 470. 
88. Only four Justices of the five-member majority found that the legislature intended to pre· 
vent illegitimate teenage pregnancies. /d. Justice Blackmun's short concurrence criticized the 
Court's decisions restricting abortions and noted that although Michael M.'s rape victim "appears 
not to have been an unwilling participant in at least the initial stages of the intricacies that took 
place," she probably did not consent to sexual intercourse. /d. at 481-87. The four-member plural-
ity rejected the claim that the legislature intended to preserve female chastity, rather than prevent 
teenage pregnancies. However, the plurality opinion noted that even if "the preservation of female 
chastity were one of the motives of the statute, and even if that motive be impermissible, peti· 
tioner's argument must fail because '(i]t is a familiar practice of constitutional law that this court 
[sic] will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit 
legislative motive.'" /d. at 472 n.7 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). 
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cism from several feminist scholars.89 Scholars argued that in uphold-
ing a statutory rape law which only punished males, the Court sanc-
tioned the paternalistic restriction of female sexual freedom and 
perpetuated the discriminatory stereotype of females as passive victims 
of sexual activity.90 Although the Court emphasized the biological dis-
tinction between the sexes, and the consequences of that distinction, the 
Court's error was in characterizing these consequences as biological, 
rather than social. 
Women do suffer "disproportionately the profound physical, emo-
tional and psychological consequences of sexual activity."91 Unfortu-
nately, culture and society force women to bear most of the nonphysi-
cal "consequences of sexual activity."92 The fact that these 
consequences are imposed by society and not by nature or biology, 
however, does not negate their existence.93 Moreover, although the ef-
fect of Michael M. may be to reinforce the social stereotype, the hold-
ing itself is basically sound: "Because virtually all of the significant[ly] 
harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage preg-
nancy fall on the young female," a legislature may elect to punish only 
the male, who "suffers few of the consequences of his conduct."IH 
In Michael M., as in Geduldig, the Court was faced with a basic 
biological difference between men and women-women can become 
pregnant and men cannot. This same biological difference will confront 
the Court when it is asked to decide the constitutionality of punitive 
sanctions involving prenatal drug use. Courts should recognize the simi-
larities between the "particularly severe" social consequences of teen-
age pregnancies and the "particularly severe" social consequences of 
prenatal drug use.96 These consequences warrant a finding that the 
state's interests in stopping all drug use, including prenatal drug use, is 
at least as important an interest as preventing teenage pregnancies. 
Moreover, to the extent criminal penalties for statutory rape furthered 
the goal of preventing teenage pregnancies, immunity plus criminal 
penalties for drug use, based on evidence of a newborn's positive toxi-
89. See. e.g., Law, supra note 77, at 998-1001; Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist 
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REv. 387, 413-29 (1984); Wildman, supra note 77; An-
dre-Clark, supra note 77. 
90. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 89, at 421-29. 
91. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471. 
92. /d. 
93. /d. at 473. 
94. /d. 
95. Id. at 472. 
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cology screen, further the goal of deterring prenatal drug use.96 
Thus, my proposal, which includes realistic treatment and rehabili-
tation alternatives, would be substantially related to legitimate state 
objectives. As such it would be upheld under the substantial relation-
ship test currently applied to gender-based classifications. For this rea-
son, a successful challenge to criminalization simply cannot be based 
on the Equal Protection· Clause.97 
Finally, the proposal suggested in this Article would be upheld 
even if subjected to the strict scrutiny standard of review, the highest 
level of scrutiny applied to equal protection cases.98 Under this stan-
dard, a court will not accept every permissible government purpose as 
sufficient to support a classification, but will instead require the govern-
ment to show that it is pursuing a "compelling" end, the value of which 
is so great that it justifies a limitation of fundamental constitutional 
rights.99 The classification must also meet the "least restrictive alterna-
tive" component of this test, i.e., "even though the governmental pur-
pose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by 
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end 
can be more narrowly achieved."100 
This proposal serves a compelling interest that cannot be achieved 
through less discriminatory means. The state has a vital interest in 
96. The state could articulate a number of other objectives for its actions: (I) the state's inter· 
est in protecting the fetus' right to potential life; (2) the state's interest in protecting the baby's 
right to be born healthy; (3) the state's interest in protecting maternal health; ( 4) the state's 
interest in reducing the economic costs of caring for drug-affected children; and (5) the state's 
interest in deterring child abuse. While these objectives might pass the strict scrutiny test, they 
would be sufficient to pass the substantial relationship test. 
97. The Supreme Court's decision in International Union, UA W v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. 
Ct. 1196 (1991), does not suggest that the use of prenatal drug use evidence would be unconstitu· 
tiona!. In Johnson Controls, an employer's regulation prohibited pregnant employees from work· 
ing in areas where lead exceeded certain levels because of health risks. The Court found that the 
regulation violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which includes pregnancy-based 
discrimination in its proscription of sex-based discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). The 
Court held that decisions about the welfare of future children must be made by parents, rather 
than the employers who hire those parents. 
This analysis was based on a statute which specifically prohibited pregnancy-based discrimi· 
nation by employers and was therefore broader than the equal protection guarantees at issue here. 
Moreover, Johnson Controls involved neither criminal conduct nor state action. The conflict was 
between an employer and a parent, not the State and a parent. Thus, the Johnson Controls analy-
sis is not applicable to an equal protection analysis of prenatal drug use, which involves a parent's 
illegal conduct and the harmful effects of that conduct. 
98. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
99. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16·6, at 1451·54 (2d ed, 
1988) (explaining the strict scrutiny standard). 
100. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
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"protecting the potentiality of human life,"101 i.e., in ensuring the 
health of babies and pregnant women. This compelling interest was 
identified in Roe v. Wade102 and, assuming applicability of the strict 
scrutiny level of review, the Supreme Court would probably identify 
the same interest in analyzing a constitutional challenge to the prosecu-
tions based on evidence of prenatal drug use. The state also has a vital 
interest in protecting the public from social and economic costs of 
drug-exposed children.103 
Moreover, there is no less restrictive alternative that would deter 
prenatal drug use. The only effective solution to the problem of drug-
exposed infants is the provision of prenatal care and drug treatment 
programs for drug-using pregnant women.10• Without the realistic fear 
of prosecution, however, there would be no incentive to seek treatment 
and no need to obtain prosecutorial immunity. Combining the threat of 
prosecution with the possibility of immunity would further the objective 
of healthier babies because it would provide the incentive for the preg-
nant drug user to seek treatment. "While it is preferable to encourage 
voluntary compliance with treatment and social services, the state must 
be able to compel treatment before all hope of help for the fetus is 
lost."l05 
This proposal includes the only response that could effectively ad-
dress the prenatal drug use problem. Therefore, it would withstand an 
equal protection challenge under the highest level of constitutional 
scrutiny. 
101. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
102. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 151, 162 (holding that the state has an "important and legitimate 
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life"). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 
S. Ct. 2791, 2817 (1992} ("Yet it must be remembered that Roe v. Wade s~ks \\ith clarity in 
establishing not only the woman's liberty but also the state's 'important and legitimate interest in 
potential life.' . . . That portion of the decision in Roe has been given too little acknowledgement 
and implementation by the Court in its subsequent cases."). 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 22-37. 
104. See Michael A. Hammer, Comment, The Constitutional, Judicial and So:lal Pitfalls 
Altendant to the Criminalization of Prenatal Maternal Substance Abuse: A Plea for Go,·ernmen-
tal Uniformity and Mercy, 22 SETON HALL L REv. 1456, 1502-04 (1992) (advocating the re-
placement of criniinalization with state-imposed maternal education and rehabilitation programs); 
Terres, supra note 18, at 85-86 ("Direct governmental intervention is necessary to compel preg-
nant women to face their responsibility to their unborn children •••• [It] is not the only solution, 
however. Efforts to educate women and to improve health care must always remain a priority in 
order to prevent harm to our nation's children.''). 
105. David H. Montague & Sharon E. McLauchlin, Drug Exposed Infants: En Ventre Sa 
Mere-And in Need of Protection, 44 BAYLOR L REV. 485, 526 (1992}. 
418 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:393 
B. Right To Privacy 
The U.S. Constitution embodies a right to privacy that protects 
individual autonomy in matters relating to procreation, childbearing, 
and childrearing.106 The privacy decisions of the Supreme Court that 
bear most directly upon this proposal are the Court's abortion deci-
sions, beginning with Roe v. Wade107 and culminating most recently 
with Planned Parenthood v. Casey.108 
In Roe, the Court held that a statute prohibiting abortions unnec-
essarily infringed on a woman's "fundamental" right to privacy. Any 
limitations on this right would only be upheld if they furthered a com-
pelling state interest. The Court then found that two state interests 
would support such limitations: the interest in the health of the mother, 
which became compelling after the first trimester of the pregnancy, and 
the interest in the potential life of the fetus, which became compelling 
upon viability.109 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court reaffirmed what it de-
scribed as the "essential holding of Roe."110 A woman has the right to 
terminate a pregnancy before viability without undue interference from 
the state, but the state can restrict abortions after fetal viability be-
cause it has a legitimate interest in protecting the health of the woman 
and the life of the potential child. The Court, however, modified the 
practical application of Roe by imposing a more relaxed "undue bur-
den" standard of judicial review on state actions affecting the right to 
privacy. m 
The "undue burden" standard requires a finding that the state ac-
tion at issue has "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle 
106. This right to privacy was first recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and was expanded to include matters relat· 
ing to procreation in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of statute prohibit· 
ing sodomy as applied to homosexuals). The legitimacy of this right is controversial and subject to 
frequent debate. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 80·95 
(1990) (arguing that a general right to privacy was established in long-standing decisions of the 
Supreme Court); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of 
Rights, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1095 (1990). 
107. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
108. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
109. 410 U.S. at 151-65. 
llO. Casey, ll2 S. Ct. at 2804. 
111. Id. at 2819. 
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in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."112 
State action with this purpose is invalid because the state has chosen a 
"means ... to further the interest in potential life," which hinders 
"the woman's free choice."113 State action having a valid purpose, but 
with the "effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a wo-
man's choice," is unconstitutional because it "cannot be considered a 
permissible means of serving its legitimate ends."11" 
Opponents of criminalization claim that a prenatal drug user's re-
productive autonomy is compromised in that she must either stop using 
drugs or have an abortion. m; Because addicted women lack the desire 
and the ability to stop using drugs, or because drug treatment is not 
available to them, the threat of prosecution "coerces" pregnant drug 
users to have abortions. However, although a woman has the right to 
choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy, this right is not 
absolute. 
[I]t is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some free-
dom to terminate her pregnancy .... The woman's liberty is 
not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the State can-
not show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later 
point in fetal development the State's interest in life has suffi-
cient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the 
pregnancy can be restricted . . . .118 
These state interests, therefore, may arguably support the punishment 
of women based solely on evidence of their prenatal drug use.117 
112. /d. at 2820. 
113. /d. 
114. /d. Under the undue burden standard, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania's spousal noli· 
fication requirement: "The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to pw•ent a significant 
number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not merely make abortions a little more 
difficult or expensive to obtain; for many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle." /d. at 
2831. 
A five-member majority invalidated this provision of the statute. Justice Blackmun, a mem-
ber of this majority, applied the strict scrutiny standard of review. /d. at 2845-46 (Biackmun, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The other four dissenting justices would apply the least 
restrictive standard-the rational basis test-and uphold the provision. /d. at 2855-60 (Rehnquist, 
CJ., dissenting). 
115. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 1460-71; Margaret Phillips, Comment, Umbilical Cords: 
The New Drug Connection, 40 BuFF. L REv. 525, 552 (1992); Denison, supra note 21, at 1134-
40;.Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Go~·ernmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Ll~·es 
After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 191-95 (1989); Barrett, supra note 18, at 232-34. 
116. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816. 
117. John E.B. Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State lnter•ene?, 23 DuQ. 
L. REv. 1, 18 (1984). However, some scholars argue that the "least burdensome means" campo-
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Prosecutions based on evidence of prenatal drug use do, in fact, 
involve procreative and reproductive decisions. However, the right to 
obtain an abortion is the right to terminate a pregnancy. The pregnant 
drug user who gives birth to a drug-exposed infant did not choose to 
terminate her pregnancy. She elected to continue her pregnancy, en-
gage in criminal conduct which risks the health of the potential child, 
and deliver the child. The issue then is whether the right to procreate 
or the right to an abortion should also include the right to make all 
three reproductive decisions listed above. 
The discussion must focus on the second decision. The pregnant 
drug user has "some freedom to terminate her pregnancy"118 and the 
right to procreate, which includes the right to make childbearing deci-
sions.119 She has the right to continue her pregnancy and deliver her 
baby. Should she also have the constitutional right to ingest drugs that 
will substantially harm her future child? The answer, of course, is 
no--for two reasons. First, there is no right to abuse a potential life 
inherent in the right to make childbearing decisions. Second, the wo-
man who uses drugs during pregnancy is engaging in criminal conduct. 
The woman who gives birth to a drug-exposed infant has chosen to 
continue her pregnancy. She has not decided to terminate her preg-
nancy, but to bear and deliver her child. Once she makes the decision 
to bring the child to term, then she must not abuse the future child. 
Clearly, the right to abort and the right to procreate cannot be equated 
with the right to abuse a potential life. "A woman who chooses to carry 
her pregnancy to term has a moral responsibility to make reasonable 
efforts toward preserving fetal health."120 The right to make childbear-
ing decisions, therefore, should not include the right to abuse a poten-
tial life. The decision to subject a future child to the risk of birth de-
fects, or death, is simply not a valid childbearing decision. 
Women also have the right to make childrearing decisions. This 
right, however, does not include the right to abuse a child. Child abuse 
cannot be justified-on moral, legal, or ethical grounds. Therefore, no 
one questions the claim that a woman who abuses her child has not 
made a valid childrearing decision. Because there is no right to abuse a 
nent of the Roe strict scrutiny standard is not satisfied through criminalization because the alter-
native of voluntary participation in treatment programs may achieve the same goal of protecting 
potential life. See, e.g., Denison, supra note 21, at 1134-40; Holland, supra note 18, at 545. 
118. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816. 
119. Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986). 
120. AMA Bd. of Trustees, supra note 4, at 2663. 
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"life" inherent in the right to make childbearing decisions, there should 
be no right to abuse a "potential life" inherent in the right to make 
childbearing decisions.121 
Regardless of the legal status of a fetus, or the arguments about 
the "life" (or lack thereoO of a fetus, it is a "potential life." Conduct 
abusing a potential life which is then carried to term, like conduct 
abusing a child, also cannot be justified or condoned on moral, legal, or 
ethical grounds.122 
Finally, the prenatal drug user is committing a crime by ingesting 
drugs. There is no constitutional right to use drugs.123 The reproductive 
decision at issue here is not the decision to procreate or the decision to 
abort, but the decision to use drugs after deciding to bear a child. The 
prenatal drug user has elected to engage in criminal conduct during her 
pregnancy. She does not have the right to commit a crime. Moreover, 
to the extent the right to abort is not absolute, the state intervention 
here is limited to the pregnant woman's conduct in ingesting drugs. It 
does not affect the rights of pregnant women engaging in lawful con-
duct. The state can justifiably intervene to prevent the mother from 
engaging in criminal conduct.124 
Thus the right to privacy cases are distinguishable. These cases 
only involved the decision to lawfully bear a child or lawfully rear a 
child. They did not address the decision to commit a crime after exer-
cising the right to bear a child. In sum, arguments based on the right 
to privacy, or the right to an abortion contained therein, are without 
121. See id. at 2664 ("[T]he responsibility of a pregnant woman to her fetus is stronger than 
that of one individual to another. The duty of a pregnant woman to her fetus is more akin to the 
obligations of a parent to his or her child."). 
122. A woman has a "moral duty to bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably 
possible." John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control ofConceptlon, Pregnancy, and 
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 438 (1983). A woman also has a legal duty to refrain from illegal 
conduct, regardless of the effect of this conduct. 
123. State v. Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Ariz. 1977); See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 
(1977); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 n.ll (1969); In ReD~ Children, 402 N.Y .S.2d 
958, 960 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978). 
124. Pregnant abusers of legal substances need prenatal care and drug treatment. and we 
must be concerned about the health of the future children of these abusers. However, pregnant 
abusers of legal substances are not deterred from seeking drug treatment or prenatal care ~usc 
of the fear of criminal sanctions. Thus, they do not need the "incentive" of prosccutorial immu-
nity. Tobacco smoking and alcoholism are also "less expensive to cure" than drug use. In addition, 
the long-term consequences of prenatal alcohol and tobacco usc are not as severe as those associ-
ated with prenatal drug use. The economic costs to society caused by these activities are not as 
substantial, and alcoholism and tobacco smoking have not generated the range of "non-drug" 
criminal activity caused by drug addiction. Therefore, there is no compelling need to prevent the 
harm to potential life caused by the prenatal abuse of legal substances. 
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merit. 
Nevertheless, the threat of prosecution may, in fact, cause some 
women to seek an abortion. To this extent, prosecuting mothers would 
affect the right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy. However, 
assuming applicability of the Supreme Court's privacy decisions, the 
criminal prosecutions of women who refuse to participate in treatment 
programs for their prenatal drug use should be upheld under the undue 
burden standard discussed in Casey. 125 A mere "effect" is simply not 
enough under this standard. The issue is whether prosecutions would 
"impose a substantial obstacle". to the exercise of the right to self-de-
termination in matters involving the pregnancy.126 There is no "sub-
stantial obstacle" here. At best, prosecutions based on prenatal drug 
use evidence pose "an unacceptable danger of deterring the exercise" of 
the right to an abortion.127 The "mere possibility that some women will 
be . . . likely to choose to have an abortion by virtue of' the criminal 
sanction does not unduly burden pregnant women.128 Therefore, based 
on the Supreme Court's current test in right to privacy cases, prenatal 
drug-use prosecutions under this proposal would be constitutional.120 
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
not only limits the penalties for crimes, but also the conduct that may 
be defined as criminal. In Robinson v. California, 130 the Court recog-
nized that drug addiction is an illness and held that a criminal statute 
prohibiting drug addiction establishes a "status" crime in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment.131 Thus, the crime of being in a personal condition, without the 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14. 
126. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820 (1992). 
127. Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1986). 
128. /d. at 829 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
129. For a critique of the argument that prosecuting mothers for prenatal drug use violates 
the right to bodily autonomy and integrity because it is analogous to forced medical procedures on 
pregnant women, see Roberts, supra note 17, at 1457. Roberts argues that the mother's interests 
are weaker in the prenatal drug use context because the mother is not required to take any action 
to benefit the fetus, no direct physical intrusion is involved, and prenatal drug use not only harms 
the fetus but has no "social justification." Therefore, governmental intervention in the prenatal 
drug use context does not affect the woman's constitutionally protected right to protect her body 
from physical intrusion. 
130. 370 u.s. 660 (1962). 
131. /d. at 665-67. " 'No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the 
use of narcOtics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the 
State to prescribe and administer narcotics.'" /d. at 660 n.l (quoting CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY 
Coos § 11721 (repealed 1972)). 
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commission of some act, is unconstitutional. The prosecution of prena-
tal drug users, based solely on their status as drug addicts, would vio-
late the Eighth Amendment. Opponents of criminalization claim that 
punishing a mother for prenatal drug use would also violate the Eighth 
Amendment. They argue that a mother would be punished "for her 
combined status as a pregnant woman and a drug addict. . . . Holding 
such addicts criminally liable for the happenstance of their having be-
come pregnant, is to criminalize them for their continuing condition of 
addiction, not for any discrete actus reus that can be perceived as vol-
untary."132 Several commentators claim drug use by addicts is an invol-
untary act and argue that any punishment for prenatal drug use would 
be unconstitutional.133 
However, neither Robinson nor the Eighth Amendment applies to 
prosecuting mothers who give birth to drug-addicted babies for drug 
use.134 Drug use is the criminal conduct usually caused by drug addic-
tion. Six years after Robinson, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment only prohibits punishment for the addiction. It does not 
preclude punishment for criminal conduct that results from the addic-
tion. In Powell v. Texas/35 the Court upheld a conviction based on a 
statute prohibiting public intoxication. The Court determined that the 
proscribed criminal act was the defendant's act of public intoxication, 
rather than his "involuntary" alcoholic status.136 
The Powell dissenters argued that the Eighth Amendment, as in-
terpreted in Robinson, precluded punishment for conduct by anyone 
who was "utterly powerless to avoid criminal guilt."137 They noted that 
the crime in Powell differed from that in Robinson because it covered 
132. Amici Brief of American Public Health Ass'n et a!. for Ap~llant, at 14, Johnson v. 
State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (No. 89-1765), reprinted in 13 Wo~tEN's RTS. L 
REP. 6, 19 (1991). See Romney, supra note 18, at 336-37; Robert Batey & Sandra Anderson 
Garcia, Prosecution of the Pregnant Addict: Does the Cruel and Unusual Punl.shment Clau.se 
Apply'!, 27 CRIM. L BuLL. 99 (1990); Hammer, supra note 104, at 1490-98. 
133. See Batey & Garcia, supra note 133, at 100-13. Robinson stands for the proposition that 
the eighth amendment prohibits the punishment of persons who, whatever their "b:uc desire[s]" 
and "propensit[ies]," have committed no proscribed wrongful act. 370 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
134. The proscribed conduct in my suggested response is the use of drugs, as C'tidenced by the 
birth of a drug-exposed infant. While many pregnant women who use drugs may be addicts, the 
drug user who is not an addict could also be prosecuted. See People v. Barry, 504 N.E.2d 1381, 
1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding "mere use does not make a person an addict"). 
135. 392 u.s. 514 (1968). 
136. Id. at 532-36. 
137. Id. at 567-68. 
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(1) the status of intoxication; and (2) being in public. However, "the 
essential constitutional defect here is the same .... [T]he particular 
defendant was ... in a condition which he had no capacity to change 
or avoid .... [He] was powerless to avoid drinking; ... and ... 
once intoxicated, he could not prevent himself from appearing in public 
places."138 
However, the Powell plurality specifically rejected expansion of 
Robinson to conduct resulting from the involuntary ingestion of drugs 
or alcohol, or any other "compulsive" conduct. The Court stated, "It is 
suggested in dissent that Robinson stands for the 'simple' but 'subtle' 
principle that '[c]riminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person 
for being in a condition he is powerless to change.' "139 The Court then 
interpreted Robinson to hold that "criminal penalties may be inflicted 
only if the accused has committed some act . . . which society has an 
interest in preventing .... "140 
The thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause was that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if 
the accused has engaged in some criminal conduct or behavior. Robin-
son does not address the issue of whether certain conduct cannot con-
stitutionally be punished because it is, in some sense, "involuntary" or 
"occasioned by a compulsion."141 The Powell plurality noted that such 
an application would undermine the "constitutional doctrine of crimi-
nal responsibility" and make the Supreme Court "the ultimate arbiter 
of the standards of criminal responsibility, in diverse areas of the crimi-
nal law, throughout the country."142 The Court was apparently con-
cerned that addiction or alcoholism would justify the commission of not 
only offenses that are part of the syndrome of the disease, but also 
offenses committed to receive the money necessary to obtain the alcohol 
or drugs, e.g., burglary, larceny, prostitution, or drug distribution.143 It 
found that conduct that is the inevitable consequence of the "status" is 
not prohibited from punishment by the Eighth Amendment.144 
138. Id. 
139. /d. at 533 (quoting 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting)). 
140. /d. 
141. Id. 
142. /d. at 533-34. 
143. /d. at 534 (characterizing the dissent's argument that the decision could be limited to 
conduct that is "a characteristic and involuntary part of the disease" as too narrow a reading of 
the issue). 
144. Powell was decided by a closely divided Court. Four justices found the defendant had a 
legitimate constitutional claim. 392 U.S. at 566-70 (Fortas, J., dissenting). One justice concurred 
in the judgment because he found the defendant had not established that his public intoxication 
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If the Eighth Amendment does not apply to criminal conduct by 
an alcoholic, i.e., involuntary public intoxication caused by the involun-
tary condition of chronic alcoholism, then it does not apply to criminal 
acts by a drug addict, i.e., the possession and use of drugs caused by 
the addiction.1411 Nor would it apply to prosecutions based on evidence 
of prenatal drug use. The drug use statute proscribes only the use of 
drugs, not the addiction. Therefore, punishment for voluntary or invol-
untary drug use after the drug user gives birth to a drug-exposed infant 
does not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment. 
This conclusion makes sense. Criminal acts resulting from some 
degree of socially developed compulsion should not be beyond society's 
control. Drug addiction may be an easily acquired disease.140 Addiction 
is also a treatable and curable (admittedly, with effort) disease. More-
over, addiction involves more than the self-administration of drugs. Ad-
diction necessitates the unlawful purchase, possession, and use of drugs 
and involves not only harm to the user but harmful social byproducts as 
well. Because addiction has a potentially destructive impact upon soci-
ety, public safety would be seriously threatened if society had no con-
trol over an addict's unlawful acts. 
A psychological-involuntariness defense would seriously threaten 
the administration and enforcement of all criminal laws. If the posses-
sion and use of drugs are protected, as necessary incidents of the addic-
tive condition, then the manufacture or distribution of drugs to the ad-
dict could be defended as a humane act which harms only the drug 
addict. Moreover, as the Powell plurality noted, the compulsion for 
drugs leads to other "non-drug" crimes, such as larceny, robbery, or 
burglary, necessitated by the addict's need to purchase drugs.147 Fi-
nally, if psychological reasons could deprive defendants of free choice, 
was compelled by his alcoholism. 392 U.S. at 548-54 (White, J., concurring). 
145. Since Powell, lower courts have consistently held that chronic alcoholism is not a defense 
to a charge of public drunkenness, and drug addiction is not a defense to a charge of use or 
poss=ion of drugs. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Herro, 587 
P.2d 1181 (Ariz. 1978); Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1969); People v. Hoy, 158 N.W.2d 
436 (Mich. 1968). See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Drug Addit:lfon or Related Memal Stale 
as Defense to Criminal Charge, 13 A.L.R. 3d 16 (1976). But see Anthony A. Cuomo, Mens Rea 
and Status Criminality, 40 S. CAL. L REV. 463, 506-12 (1967) (claiming that it is unconstitu-
tional for addicts to be punished for possession or use or drugs). 
146. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 n.9. (1962) ("Not only may addiction 
innocently result from the use of medically prescribed narcotics, but a p1:rson may even be a 
narcotics addi~t from the moment of his birth."). 
147. Powell, 392 U.S. at 534. 
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defendants whose actions are caused by necessity (e.g., poverty) or du-
ress could argue that their criminal conduct was involuntary because 
they had neither the chance nor the capacity to choose a lawful 
alternative. 
The addictive status of a defendant, as a matter of law, does not 
excuse criminal conduct. More importantly, the addictive status of a 
defendant, including a prenatal drug user, as a matter of policy should 
not preclude prosecuting the defendant for her criminal conduct. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Prenatal drug use, like the general drug problem, is a serious so-
cioeconomic problem and a complex legal problem. The criminal jus-
tice system, however, must do more than punish prenatal drug users. 
Criminal sanctions that only stigmatize the prenatal drug user are an 
ineffective and counterproductive solution. The threat of incarceration 
does not deter prenatal drug use, and incarceration itself does nothing 
to educate the prenatal drug user or improve life for her children. 
While punishing prenatal drug users is only a "finger in the dam" solu-
tion, to simply tell the user to "seek treatment" is worse. The tragic 
effects of prenatal drug use can only be prevented with a long-term 
investment. The appropriate solution, therefore, is to rehabilitate the 
user by "forcing" her to obtain treatment. 
The phrase "just say no" is meaningless to prenatal drug users 
who want treatment but use drugs to escape their environment. A 
drug-addicted pregnant woman, like a drug addicted man or non-preg-
nant woman, is simply unable to "just say no." The pregnant addict 
must have something to say "yes" to. Prenatal and postpartum drug 
treatment, with the promise of prosecutorial immunity, is the solution. 
It is not a total solution, but it would do more to help the addict and 
her future children than random criminal prosecutions or wishful think-
ing about drug treatment. 
